Is public R & D spending complementary and thus ''additional'' to private R & D spending, or does it substitute for and tend to ''crowd out'' private R & D? Conflicting answers are given to this question. We survey the body of available econometric evidence accumulated over the past 35 years. A framework for analysis of the problem is developed to help organize and summarize the findings of econometric studies based on time series and cross-section data from various levels Ž . of aggregation laboratory, firm, industry, country . The findings overall are ambivalent and the existing literature as a whole Ž . is subject to the criticism that the nature of the ''experiment s '' that the investigators envisage is not adequately specified. We conclude by offering suggestions for improving future empirical research on this issue. q
Introduction
The opening of the new millennium finds a national public-sector civilian research enterprise whose scale and scope in most of the world's countries surpasses that of any previous period of their history. Among the leading industrial nations this may be seen as the outcome of a long historical process ) Corresponding author. Department of Economics, University of California at Berkeley, 549 Evans-Hall a 3880, Berkeley, CA 94720-3880, USA. E-mail: bronwyn.hall@nuf.ox.ac.uk 1 Also corresponding author. E-mail:
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initiated with state patronage during the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. But, only since the closing decades of the nineteenth century have organized research and development activities begun to make appreciable claims upon the productive resources of those societies. 2 Since then, however, the fraction of real gross national product being directed by both private and governmental agencies toward expanding the base of scientific and technological knowledge for non-defense purposes has trended up-2 Ž . Ž . See, e.g., David 1998a; b , Lenoir 1998 , and sources cited therein.
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Most of the growth in the relative importance of this intangible form of capital accumulation has come within the past half-century: even under the stimulus of military preparations during the 1930s, total R & D expenditures in countries such as the US, the UK and Japan remained in the range between two-thirds and one-quarter of one percentage point of their respective national product figures. 3 In the aftermath of World War II, the belief that organized research and development could stimulate economic growth and contribute to improving economic welfare led to the creation of many new public institutions supporting civilian science and engineering, and pushed the civil R & D fraction upwards towards the one percentage point level in a growing number of countries. The Cold War Era fostered a further expansion of government agency research programs in non-defense as well as military technologies, and established models for the performance of government-funded R & D by private sector contractors. Thus, accompanying the institutional expansion in public sector production of scientific and technological knowledge, there were enormous increases in the scale of public financial obligations for R & D activities performed primarily by non-governmental agents. Added to these, a variety of tax and subsidy measures was introduced with the intention of encouraging private firms to undertake R & D projects at their own expense. 4 Although most people believe that government R & D activities contribute to innovation and produc-3 Ž . See the estimates in Edgerton 1996 , Table 5 .8, but note that Ž the R&D fraction shown for Japan as 0.22% of national income . in 1934 actually refers to share of GNP and is based on the results of a 1930 survey; a Japanese survey taken in 1942 returned expenditures on the order of 1.5% of GNP. See Odagiri and Goto Ž . 1993 , p. 84. 4 For an historical account focusing upon the US in the twenti-Ž . eth century, see Mowery and Rosenberg 1989 and the contributions dealing with particular sectors and industries in Nelson Ž . 1982 . For the post-Cold War climate affecting government Ž . support, especially in the US, see Noll 1997 . Nelson Ž . 1993 brings together profiles of the evolution of the 'national innovation systems' of a variety of industrialized and some devel-Ž . oping countries, mainly since the 1960s; Soligen 1994 provides a broader, internationally comparative treatment of relations between scientific research and the twentieth century state. tivity, many economists and policymakers have grown frustrated with the paucity of systematic statistical evidence documenting a direct contribution from public R & D. The burden of econometric findings concerning the productivity growth effects of R & D seems to be that there is a significantly positive and relatively high rate of return to R & D investments at both the private and social levels. Yet, quite generally, privately funded R & D in manufacturing industries is found to yield a substantial premium over the rates of return from ''own productivity improvements'' derived from R & D performed with government funding. 5 In a recent survey, Ž . Griliches 1995, p. 82 , suggests that the especially pronounced differential over the returns on tangible capital investments observed at the private level may reflect individual firms' perceptions of especially high private risk in the case of R & D. The latter would, of course, lead to the imposition of higher hurdle rates of return for firms' individual funding decisions; whereas, by comparison, governmentfunded industrial R & D projects would be seen as Ž . carrying less private risk, especially as much of it is devoted to ''product innovation'' for ''output'' that eventually is to be sold back to the government procurement agency under the terms of ''cost plus'' contracts. In such circumstances there is little basis for expecting that the R & D it performed with public monies would have a substantial direct impact on the contracting firm's own productivity.
The issue: substitution Õs. complementarity in public and priÕate R & D inÕestments
Having a direct impact on innovation that shows up as industrial productivity growth, however, is not the only way in which public R & D may enhance 5 Ž . Ž . See Griliches 1995 and Hall 1996 for recent surveys. Negative findings on the productivity growth payoff from government expenditures for industrial R&D emerged from an earlier Ž . econometric studies by Griliches 1980 , Griliches and Lichten-Ž . Ž . Ž . berg 1984 , Bartelsman 1990 and Lichtenberg and Siegel 1991 , some of which obtained coefficients on federally funded R&D that were close to zero as well as statistically insignificant. been undertaken with other purposes in view. Government agencies sponsor some research and development projects and programs because the knowledge gained is expected to be germane to their respective mission capabilities, as often is the case, for example, in areas such as military technology and logistics, and public health. This kind of R & D work sometimes will be assigned to the staffs of public institutes and national laboratories, although it equally may be procured through government contracts with R & D-performing firms in the private sector. 6 Beyond its putative direct value as an input into the provision of government-provided services, both the defense-related and civilian R & D expenditures funded through public agencies may generate social benefits, in the form of knowledge and training ''spillovers.'' These often are held to enhance private sector productive capabilities, and, specifically, to encourage applied R & D investments by firms that lead to technological innovations -from which will flow future streams of producer and consumer surpluses. The theoretical plausibility of such claims notwithstanding, available empirical evidence on the issue remains rather short of being conclusive, to say 6 For example, the 1996r1997 data compiled by Stoneman Ž . 1999, Tables 1 and 6 show that the UK government funded Ž . 31.8% of total military and civil R&D, somewhat less than half Ž . of which 14.4% of total R&D was performed in government departments and laboratories run by the Research Councils. From Ž . the National Science Board 1998, Appendix Table 4 -3 figures Ž . for the US in 1996, the corresponding federal and non-federal government shares in funding and performance are seen to be 32.5% and 8.9%, respectively. By adding to the latter figure the 3.3% of federal government-funded R&D that was performed in non-profit federally funded research and development centers Ž . analogous to the research units of the UK Research Councils , we arrive at 12.2% for the overall share of total R&D that was performed in US government research facilities. The latter, like the US governmental share in total R&D funding, rather closely resembles the contemporary situation prevailing in the UK. 7 See, for example, the recent formulation of the economic case for public support of research, in National Research Council Ž . 1999 , especially Chaps. 1-2, with historical case studies drawn from the US federal government's role in the development of computing and communications technologies. the least. Economists, continuing in the tradition Ž . pioneered by the research of Blank and Stigler 1957 , recurrently examine a variety of data for signs as to whether the relationship between public and private R & D investments is on balance characterized by ''complementarity,'' or by ''substitution.'' Several recent econometric studies, for example, document positive, statistically significant ''spillover'' effects via the stimulation of private R & D investment by publicly funded additions to the stock of scientific knowledge. 8 The same might be said regarding a considerably more extensive body of historical case studies, detailing the influence of government-sponsored research programs and projects on commercial technological innovation. 9 Many among the latter studies, however, focus on US federally funded research performed in academic institutions or quasiacademic public institutes, and so do not bear immediately on the questions raised concerning the impacts of publicly sponsored R & D conducted under contract by industrial corporations. Nor do they inform us about the effects of publicly funded mission-oriented commercial research in the rest of the world. Moreover, while some studies in this area have been able to support claims of positive spillovers from public to private expenditures, there is no shortage of investigations that arrive at the contrary conclusion. Thus, it is found that some public R & D contracts actually have done little or nothing to promote the efficient functioning of the government agencies involved, and yet also failed to provide significant commercial ''spillovers.'' In still other instances, the benefits that private companies derived from the public R & D expenditures are said to have been both predictable and large enough to have elicited financing by profit-seeking firms, had the political process not invoked subsidization of those projects at the tax-payers' expense.
10 Wherever publicly funded R & D is seen to be simply substitut-8 That, at least, is the inferential interpretation of the results
Ž
. Ž . Ž . reported by Jaffe 1989 , Adams 1990 , Acs et al. 1991 and Ž . Toole 1999a . See further discussion in Section 3.4.
9 Among recent, sophisticated contributions to this literature, Ž . Ž . see Link and Scott 1998 and National Research Council 1999 . 10 Ž . See, e.g., the examination of Cohen and Noll 1991 of a selection of large-scale mission-oriented commercial R&D programs that were funded by the US federal government.
( )ing for, or actually ''crowding-out'' private R & D investment, it obviously is hard to justify such expenditures on the grounds that they exerted an immediate net positive impact upon industrial innovation and productivity growth.
11
Simply counting up the numbers of findings pro and con that have accumulated on the issue of public-private R & D complementarity since the mid-1960s, however, cannot be very informative. Our approach instead will be to survey the available body of econometric work systematically, and in some detail, from an analytical perspective. Although we take notice of a number of time-series studies that have been carried out at the macroeconomic level, most of this inquest is concerned with research that focuses on the impact of public R & D contracts and grants upon private R & D investment by manufacturing firms and industries. It is there that the bulk of R & D expenditures by the world's developed economies continues to be concentrated. Our purpose in this is to assess the reliability of the statistical findings and to arrive at a better understanding of the reasons for the persisting lack of a clear-cut empirical consensus in the literature.
Three quite restricted questions will be asked regarding those investigations. First, is the design of the statistical analysis such that it can yield any reliable findings on the question of whether government R & D expenditures do or do not have a significant and economically palpable impact upon their private sector counterparts? Secondly, where the findings are credible, may we conclude that government subsidy programs do not displace private R & D investment, but instead have the complementary effect of inducing additional company-funded R & D activities? Thirdly, how can the econometric findings be reconciled with those of other well-designed studies that addressed ostensibly the same question, yet arrived at different conclusions?
At this time, the econometric results obtained from careful studies at both the micro-and macro-11 It remains conceivable, however, that some special features of the government-sponsored projects create capabilities in the performing firms that are conducive in the longer run to increased private R&D investment, to higher marginal innovation yields, or to both. levels tend to be running in favor of findings of complementarity between public and private R & D investments. But, that reading is simply an unweighted summary based upon some 30 diverse studies; it is not a conclusion derived from a formal statistical ''meta-analysis,'' and in no sense is it offered here as a judgement that would pretend to settle the issue definitively. To formally weigh up Ž and aggregate the available and still-growing array . of statistical analyses seems to us a virtually impossible task in this case. We are not dealing with statistical results that have been generated by properly designed ''experiments'', where provision was made in the policy process for replication and ''controls.'' Instead, we are dealing with ex-post inquiries, and the results reported by many of the individual papers that constitute the literature on this topic reflect a convolution of many counterbalancing effects that are further compounded with the effects of a varying mix of public funding and other incentives for R & D activities. The ability of the econometricians to impose ex-post statistical controls varies widely among these studies. Moreover, they are distributed over differing time periods, and across a variety of scientific and technological fields, as well as diverse sectors and different economies.
Inasmuch as the spheres of investigation as well as the findings considered here are far from uniform, it is difficult to see what good would be served by striving for a broad empirical generalization that might mask clear-cut instances, however few, where publicly funded R & D is found substantially to displace private investment. Indeed, the better way of proceeding would seem to lie in trying more precisely to identify and delineate the characteristics of the circumstances in which ''substitution'' effects predominate. Policy making in this area of growing long-term importance calls for more specific empirical support and guidance if it is to advance beyond general theoretical arguments, intuitive practical judgements, and political rhetoric.
Cautions regarding the surÕey's scope and limitations
It should be made explicit at the outset that the present review is addressed to only one aspect of the ( )broader empirical picture that is of interest for public policy formation. For one thing, we do not examine the large body of evidence on the relative productivity impacts of public and private R & D.
12 A second issue that we do not treat in any detail is the other side of the interdependence of public and private R & D spending, namely, the latter's impact upon the former. Many of the micro-level empirical studies we have surveyed treat public R & D either explicitly or implicitly as an exogenous influence on private R & D within an investment framework. Consequently, in a number of instances we do find it necessary to point out the econometric consequences of ignoring the existence of latent variables that may jointly effect both public-and private-sector decisions to allocate R & D funding to specific industrial areas, and to have the work performed by particular Ž . rather than randomly drawn firms. Our discussion recurrently touches on this point, arguing that more attention to structural modeling of government agency behavior as well as industrial R & D responses is needed for a proper interpretation of the overall, reduced-form findings.
13 This may be seen as an instance of the more general case that David Ž . and Hall 1999 advance for taking an explicit structural modeling approach to mitigate the frequency of apparent contradictions and ambiguities in the econometric literature.
Organization
The remaining presentation is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a conceptual framework for understanding the net effects of public R & D upon private R & D investment activities. Section 3 reviews and critiques the available econometric research findings, beginning with studies carried out using data for the line-of-business and laboratory Ž . level Section 3.1 , and progressing upwards to those 12 More recent work on this question is surveyed by Klette et al.
Ž
. 2000 .
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Ž
. The studies by Link 1991 and Leyden et al. Ž . 1989 are noticed as having set a good example for future work in this regard. Ž concerned with effects at the level of the firm Sec-. Ž . tion 3.2 , the industry Section 3.3 and the aggre-Ž . gate economy Section 3.4 . Because the bulk of the economic research on this question looks at publicly funded R & D that is being performed under the terms of government contracts with commercial firms, the main focus of discussion in this survey falls upon programs of that kind. In Section 3.5, however, notice is taken also of a small body of econometric studies that examine the impacts on private R & D of publicly fundedrpublicly performed research or publicly fundedrnon-profit performed research.
14 We conclude in Section 4 with several methodological observations and suggestions for future research in this area of perennial policy relevance.
''Net'' private R & D effects of public R & D: a conceptual framework
Before proceeding further, it is appropriate to pause to ask what modern ''technology policy measures'' have been meant to achieve. Presumably the central rationale for government support of R & D is the correction of the market failures in the production of scientific and technological knowledge, arising from the ''incomplete private appropriability'' Ž . problems identified by Nelson 1959 and Arrow Ž . 1962 . Economists have indicated two main policy responses to the resulting tendency towards underprovision of knowledge-based innovative effort on the part of profit-seeking business entities: direct procurement andror production in public facilities, and incentives for a greater amount of private investment. We have here eschewed issues concerning the first of these, primarily those involving the performance of public research institutes and national labo-14 Ž . Recent studies by Jaffe and Trajtenberg 1996 and Jaffe et al. Ž . 1998 use patent citations to investigate the flow of knowledge and commercial technology out of federal labs, but our discussion is restricted to papers that explicitly deal with the impacts upon private R&D investment.
( )ratories, and have restricted our review exclusively to the second class of policy responses.
Tax incentiÕes Õs. direct subsidies for R & D
Under that heading two main policy instruments may be identified: tax incentives that reduce the cost of R & D, and direct subsidies that raise the private Ž . marginal rate of return MRR on investment in such activities. Although not strictly necessary, the primary difference in execution between these two policy instruments is that the former typically allows the private firms to choose projects, whereas the latter usually is accompanied by a government directed project choice, either because the government spends the funds directly or because the funds are distributed via grants to firms for specific projects or research areas.
The 15 Tax credits, however, do not leave the composition of R & D unaffected. As firms expand their R & D activity in response to linked tax offsets against earnings, the incentives are likely to favor projects that will generate greater profits in the short-run. Consequently, projects with high social rates of return, and long-run exploratory projects and ''research infrastructure'' investments in particular, may be less favored by the expansion of private funding. In this way, rather weaker ''spillover'' benefits to other firms and industries would be generated by the private response to extensive reliance upon this particular pro-R & D policy instrument.
By contrast, direct funding of R & D programs designated by government agencies allows public R & D subsidies to be targeted toward projects that are perceived to offer high marginal social rates of return to investments in knowledge. At least in principle, such funding could be concentrated in areas where there was a large gap between the social and the private rate of return. For this reason, direct R & D subsidies or government spending on basic research activities should not be expected to displace private real R & D investment, except via its generic impacts on the price of research and development inputs that are in inelastic supply. Yet, the possibility remains that in the politics of technology policy formation, there will be strong pressures to provide subsidies for projects with high private marginal rates of return -possibly to assure the appearance of successful public ''launch aid'', or simply because the prospective private payoffs make lobbying for subsidies an attractive undertaking. In such circumstances, it is more likely that increased direct government funding for industrial R & D projects would enable firms correspondingly to reduce their own outlays. This form of ''investment displacement'' arises primarily because R & D activities are heterogeneous rather than homogeneous, and it is distinguishable from, and additional to the form of Ž . ''crowding out'' identified by David and Hall 1999 as operating through the R & D input market effects of public expenditures.
The need for a structural framework
When considered as a whole, the literature under review here may be characterized as predominantly inductive in its approach to considering the effects of government R & D funding upon the level of business R & D investment behavior. That is not simply to say that the orientation of this work has been primarily empirical rather than analytical, but, rather than the empirical approach pursued is essentially descriptive in nature, aiming at establishing the sign and magnitude of the overall or ''net'' effect in question. Few studies in this area have been espe-( )cially concerned to delineate the different channels of influence that may connect R & D resource allocation in the two spheres, and fewer still attempt structural estimation in order to ascertain the character and strength of the underlying effects associated with each such channel.
Although all these empirical studies acknowledge being motivated by the same over-arching policy issue, the widespread tendency to eschew explicit structural modeling has reinforced the common failing of econometric work in this field to specify adequately what ''experiment'' the investigators implicitly envisage conducting. In other words, supposing one could vary government policy, what ob-Ž . served pairings of policy action s and sequelae would establish whether public and private R & D were ''complements'' or ''substitutes?'' Taken together with the fact that a large number of very different empirical ''experiments'' at various levels Ž . of aggregation are contemplated in effect by the research literature, this lack of specification contributes to the difficulties of interpreting the individual findings and reconciling the seeming contradictions among them.
For the foregoing reasons, rather than out of any methodological precommitment to favor structural modeling approaches in econometric analysis, we believe it will be best to review the evidence presented by the individual studies only after having set out a general conceptual framework that identifies the array of hypothesized micro-level determinants of private sector R & D investment, and relates these in turn to relationships that hold and manifest themselves at the macro-level. That is our task in the present section. The firm is assumed to rationally consider the expected cost and benefit streams for each project, in order to calculate its expected rate of return. Under certain conditions, these can be thought of as internal rates of return and therefore used by the firm in question to rank the associated projects in descending order of anticipated yield, thereby forming its MRR schedule.
Determinants of priÕate R & D inÕestment at the micro-leÕel
A downward-sloping schedule of this kind ap-Ž pears in Fig. 1 , where the marginal yield and the . marginal cost of capital is plotted on the vertical axis, and the horizontal axis gives the cumulated amount of investment required as one proceeds down Ž the list of projects. Following expositional convention, each project is implicitly taken as being finely divisible, so that the resulting MRR schedule is . continuous and continuously differentiable . Under 16 This formulation abstracts from important issues concerning the determinants of the firm's access to the scientific and engineering knowledge base that is relevant for formulating plausibly feasible R&D projects, and estimating the time distribution of the costs and benefits of the innovations they would generate. There is a well-known recursion problem here, inasmuch as among the research projects that a rational decision process would need to consider is the project for gaining the knowledge required to construct and evaluate its current ''innovation possibility set''. But, in a full dynamic specification, it is straightforward analytically to treat the latter as a lagged endogeneous variable.
( )this construction, as one moves along a given schedule describing the distribution of projects in the firm's prevailing ''technological innovation possibility set,'' there is no alteration in the constellation of other variables that would influence the rates of return on the array of R & D projects in the firm's potential portfolio. The net impact of any and all alternations in those other conditions, therefore, must show up as shifts in the MRR schedule.
As also may be seen from Fig. 1 , the firm faces a Ž . marginal cost of capital MCC schedule, which reflects the opportunity cost of investment funds at different levels of R & D investment. 17 The upward slope of this schedule over its full range is attributable to the fact that as the volume of R & D investment is increased the firm will have to move from financing projects with internally generated Ž . funds i.e., retained earnings to calling upon exter-Ž . nal equity and debt funding. Use of retained earnings for R & D accounts for the flat range at the left of the MCC schedule, whereas the firm's increased recourse to external financing would tend to push its marginal costs of capital upwards.
18
It should be apparent that as the MCC schedule in Fig. 1 describes the opportunity cost of capital, it would slope upwards eventually. This must be so even were it the case that all of the firm's R & D investment remained financed out of retained earn-17 This implicitly holds constant the amount of other, tangible capital formation expenditures that the firm has scheduled for the planning period in question. Although the assumption of risk neutrality on the part of the firm is implied by the use of the expected MRR as a sufficient statistic to describe each project in the portfolio, it should be recognized that in practical capitalbudgeting exercises firms add premia to their marginal costs of capital, forming ''hurdle rates of return'' that allow for the riskiness of various classes of investment. Although, for expositional simplicity it has been supposed that the tangible capital formation budget has been predetermined, at the margin R&D should compete with all other capital projects on the basis of their risk-adjusted internal rates of return. 18 Obviously, in the case of R&D intensive ''start-ups'' there are no retained earnings upon which to draw. But, the possibility exists of borrowing capital from employees by paying them with stock option, which may keep the marginal cost of capital down so long as there is an adequate supply of qualified personnel who also happen to have a high tolerance for risk, although issuance of stock options does have a cost due to its effect in diluting equity.
ings; at the margin, expansion of the R & D investment budget would force the firm to turn to external financing for its tangible capital acquisition projects. The foregoing simplified schema can be represented by the following equations:
where R is the level of R & D expenditure, and X and Z are vectors of other ''shift variables'' that determine the distribution of project rates of return and the associated marginal costs of capital, respectively. The X-variables reflect:
i The ''technological opportunities'' governing the ease with which it is possible to generate Ž . innovations relevant to the firm's market area ; Ž .
ii The state of demand in its potential market area or line-of-business; Ž .
iii Institutional and other conditions affecting the ''appropriability'' of innovation benefits. Correspondingly, the Z-variables include:
Ž . ii Macroeconomic conditions and expectations affecting the internal cost of funds, via the general state of price-earnings ratios in equity markets; Ž .
iii Bond market conditions affecting the external cost of funds; Ž . iv The availability and terms of venture-capital finance, as influenced by institutional conditions Ž . such as the development of IPO markets and the tax treatment of capital gains. As is depicted by Fig. 1 , in the firm's profit maximizing equilibrium the optimal level of R & D investment is found at R U , where the MRR and the marginal cost of funds are equalized:
Several points are now obvious about the relationship between private R & D investment and public
we take the provision of public funds to be exogenous, the effects of such ''shocks'' would show up as a shift of either the firm's MRR schedule or its MCC schedule, or of both. For example, direct R & D subsidies, and costsharing arrangements by public agencies, by relieving the firm of some joint costs of research and development activities would be tantamount to shifting the position of its MCC schedule to the right. Had the firm initially been facing increasing marginal costs of capital, this change would permit the undertaking of additional projects with its own moneyother things being equal, of course. 19 To cite another specific illustration, the award of government R & D contracts to a small firm also might have the effect of lowering the recipient's capital costs at the margin; especially in the case of start-up enterprises, where this could act as a signal for external funding sources to apply a smaller risk premium when setting their lending terms.
A Ž . b Where public funds are made available for construction of test facilities and the acquisition of durable research equipment, and also pay the fixed costs of assembling specialized research teams, the firm involved may be able to conduct further R & D Ž . projects of its own at lower incremental cost, and thereby derive higher expected internal rates of return on its R & D investments.
Ž . c Government contract R & D, by signaling future public sector product demand, and private sector 19 It should be obvious, however, that were the firm facing a completely inelastic MCC constraint, the public contract funding would not have any positive incremental impact upon the level of company-funded R&D.
demand in markets for dual-use goods and services, may raise the expected marginal rates of return on product or process innovation targeted to those markets.
There is a distinct possibility that in the case of Ž . Ž . the above-mentioned effects a and c , the technological knowledge and market information associated with publicly funded R & D performed by one firm could result in ''spillovers.'' The latter would, similarly, raise the expected marginal rates of return for other firms in the same industry, and also for firms in other industries. Public R & D performed in academic and other non-profit institutions, including government laboratories, also could have correspondingly positive spillover effects. This is so particularly where the research resulted in the development of ''infrastructural knowledge'' -general principles, research tools and techniques, and skill acquisition that raised the expected rates of return on commercially oriented, applied R & D projects. 
Distinguishing between goÕernment R & D contracts and grants
When considering the potential ''net'' effects of public R & D activities, it is likely to be important to distinguish between public contracts and grants. Government R & D contracts in most instances are financial outlays to procure research results that are expected to assist the public agency in better defining and fulfilling its mission objectives. Such contracts are the largest component of public awards made to private for-profit firms, and also include all arrangements to purchase R & D-intensive public goods. This category covers much of the public aerospace and defense expenditure. Public grants, on the other hand, are usually competitive financial awards that do not carry any future public commitment to purchase. They are the primary mechanism 20 Ž . Ž . Link 1991 and David et al. 1992 suggest a variety of ''spillover'' channels through which the infrastructureforming aspects of so-called ''basic'' research funded -and in some cases performed -in the public sector has a complementary impact upon private sector R&D investment. From the preceding discussion, it might appear that the micro-level impact on private R & D investment of both government contracts for industrial R & D and grants awarded to non-profit organizations would be unambiguously positive. But, there are two sorts of countervailing influences, both of which are likely to operate more strongly in the case of contracts. First, the performance of contract-specified lines of R & D with public funding may simply sub-Ž . stitute for some if not all of the investment that the performing firms otherwise would have been prepared to undertake in order to be in a position to bid successfully for related government procurement contracts.
Secondly, publicly funded R & D also may militate against private sector investments in the same technological areas, because the expected rates of return to investments by firms that do not receive contracts tend to be lowered by the prospect that government contractors would succeed in producing commercially exploitable innovations. Doing so could leave them well positioned to enter the final product market with significant first-mover advantages. Non-contract receivers also might be discouraged from undertaking their own R & D by the anticipation that the government procurement agency in question would have an incentive to disseminate cost-saving and quality-enhancing innovations, as a means of enabling entry and greater competition in the end-product market. When viewed from the latter perspective, ''dual-use'' programs of government procurement of R & D-intensive goods take on the appearance of a two-edged sword.
21
Both the direct and the indirect ''displacement'' effects just considered may be conceptualized as altering the shape of the firms' respective MRR schedules, reducing expected marginal returns on R & D projects belonging to particular technological areas that were ''targeted'' for public contract support. Although it is clear in principle that the policy prescription should be for the government to select projects for subsidization that the private sector is not likely to undertake, or not undertake in sufficient volume, matters may be otherwise in actual practice. Pressures within public agencies for high ''success rates'' in contract awards may lead to the use in R & D funding decisions of selection criteria that put heavy weight on factors that are correlated positively with high expected rates of return to private R & D funding. Therefore, when investigating the net effects of government-funded R & D at the micro-level, it is important to distinguish between programs that 21 Government procurement costs may be reduced by taking advantage of spillovers from industry-funded R&D directed towards civilian products. But the potential for the R&D performed under cost-plus procurement contracts to have spillover effects on company financed R&D might, correspondingly, be nullified by the heightened anticipation of competitive entry into the business of exploiting dual-use designs. Such opportunities may exist where new high-tech systems required by government have components, or utilize methods applicable to the production of goods for private purchasers. On the benefits of dual-use technology pro-Ž . grams, see Branscomb and Parker 1993 . ( ) provide grant funding and those that involve contracts. Likewise, when dealing with questions concerning aggregate level effects of changes in policies affecting public R & D, one should make allowance for the effects of any significant alterations in the distribution of funding between those two modes.
Although government grants typically do not have Ž a final product demand-increasing component such as is frequently present in the case of public con-. tracts for R & D performance , they may cause the MRR schedule to be shifted upwards nonetheless. This would occur because a program of grant-funded research had raised firms' R & D efficiency, or had improved the risk-return pattern on other projects. The convention in the literature, however, has been to abstract from the ways in which these effects of grant-type funding for industrial R & D would impinge upon the shape or position of firms' MRR schedules, and so to identify whatever effects ensue as produced by shifts in the MCC schedule.
Three main analytical cases have been delineated. In the first, it is assumed that the firm is asset-con-Ž . strained and thus faces a perfectly inelastic vertical MCC schedule at its current level of R & D investment. The award of a subsidy in the form of a public grant then shifts the MCC curve to the right, increasing the firm's performance of R & D by just the full amount of the subsidy. The second case postulates that the public grant shifts an upward sloping MCC curve to the right, so that the amount of the incremental increase in the amount of R & D the firm undertakes increases by less than the grant award. The third case considers that the MCC schedule is Ž . perfectly elastic horizontal at the pre-grant equilibrium, but is shifted downwards because the signal to equity holders provided by the public grant award lowers the firm's internal cost of funds. The magnitude of the increase in private R & D investment will then depend on both the strength of the ''signal'', which is likely to vary directly with the relative size of the grant, and on the slope of the firm's MRR schedule. Other things being equal, the ''flatter'' is the MRR schedule, the greater will be the increase in the induced amount of private R & D investment.
Thus, only the last of these speculative situations envisages the possibility of a complementarity effect of public grants for industrial R & D, i.e., one that would elicit additional private R & D expenditures.
Grants to firms for R & D are likely to be used in ways that assure greater private appropriability of the benefits than is the norm for grant-funded research in academic institutions, and similar non-profit research institutes. There consequently may be justification for having presumed, in the foregoing analysis, that contracts yield no positive spillover effects that would induce significantly increased private R & D investment. But, by the same token, the same presumption should not be extended to considerations of the impact of all public sector grant funding.
Short-run ''net'' impacts on priÕate R & D: from micro-to macro-leÕel effects
In general, the likely direction of net effects of public R & D contracts on private R & D investment remains ambiguous. The previous discussion has reviewed an array of channels at the micro-level through which public contracts as well as grants would have positive effects on the level of privately funded R & D activity. On the other side of the ledger, however, two principal arguments have been advanced on behalf of supposing that public expenditures for industrial R & D would exert a ''crowding out'' effect on private R & D investment. The first of these is simply the micro-level displacement of funding, previously discussed. This would occur where contracts are targeted in areas of technological development that firms otherwise would still find it worthwhile undertaking; the resulting alteration in the shape of the MRR schedule may be such as to push it downwards and to the left.
The second argument introduces macro-level considerations. There is likely to be upward pressure on the prices of R & D inputs when the provision of funding to a particular firm or group of firms occurs in the context of an expanded government R & D program that absorbs substantial scientific and engineering personnel, along with other specialized materials and facilities. The resulting increased costs associated with the array of potential private R & D projects implies a lowering of the MRR schedule; and, other things being unchanged, that translates into a reduced level of business R & D investment.
Where will the balance be struck between the opposing forces arising from increased public sector R & D expenditures at higher levels of aggregation Without having fully specified both the magnitudes of the elasticities, and the shifts in schedules due to spillover effects, in an analogous manner for the microeconomic framework depicted by Fig. 1 , the foregoing review of the static qualitative argu-22 Attention should be called to the analytical difficulty of passing explicitly from the micro-level framework of the previous subsections to the macro-level. In principle it would be possible to construct an aggregate private marginal efficiency of R&D invest-Ž ment schedule, from the union of all the projects each with their . individually perceived expected internal rates of return . As that might well involve duplicative investments in some projects, it should be evident that the private expectations would generally not be realized. The consistent aggregate private marginal efficiency of investment schedule would be lower, even with spillovers it is likely to lie below the aggregate social marginal efficiency of investment schedule. But the real difficulty lies in passing from the aggregate private MRR schedule to the aggregate demand for R&D investment when firms are realistically heterogeneous. The distribution of projects is not identical across firms, and neither do they all face the same MCC schedule. This means that there is nothing to guarantee that the same ranking of all the projects would be selected by a central profit-maximizing agent charged with allocating the private sector's total R&D funding. ments for and against complementarity leaves one unable to determine the sign of the net impact of public subsidies on the level of business R & D expenditures. The general point that the foregoing discussion does bring out clearly, however, is the presence of identification problems due to the fact that the MRR and MCC curves may be shifting simultaneously. This must be dealt with if econometric studies are to succeed either in providing reliable estimates for the critical underlying elasticity parameters, or in simply ascertaining the sign of the net effect of public R & D contracts. It has been pointed out that both fixed costs associated with R & D startup, and resource constraint effects on input prices that are correlated with individual firms' receipts of funding, may be shifting the MCC schedule. By holding those effects essentially constant by the use of an appropriate econometric specification, including proper instrumental variables, it should be possible to evaluate the net impact of public R & D contracts on private R & D investment demand. The identified effect would measure the net movement of the firm's MRR schedule, holding fixed the opportunity cost of capital.
''Dynamic'' or long-run effects of R & D subsidies
Even though most of the empirical literature has been devoted to quantifying these presumed short-run Ž . ''static'' effects, we should recognize at least two ''dynamic'' or long-run effects that are partially the outcome of public R & D funding. First, informational spillovers from the advance of public science and engineering knowledge, much of which is made possible by government R & D activities, will likely shift the firm's MRR schedule outward over time. Since new knowledge is the main source of new technological opportunities, the outward shift of the MRR curÕe assumes that these opportunities take the form of higher project returns. Of course, such effects would be felt with variable lags and are likely to be localized among some subset of the underlying projects. So, the relevant schedules would undergo changes in shape as well as position and the impacts will not necessarily be felt symmetrically throughout the population of firms. A second dynamic effect stems from the training of new scientists and engineers. There is a strong and important emphasis in the US and UK public research enterprise on training, particularly within the research universities. Due to the trend toward increasingly heavy reliance upon foreign graduate students as research assistants on grant-funded academic research projects, one must not simply presume the existence of tight coupling between training activities and the future availability of qualified research personnel in the labor markets where such training occurred. But, insofar as there is a lagged input supply response from expanded public funding Ž . of R & D grants , this could show up at the microeconomic level as an outward drift of the MRR schedule over time.
23 But, if one considers the situation in the market for industrial R & D personnel, it is more natural to conceptualize the aggregate effect in terms of a downward shift of the labor supply schedule. The latter would thus be a factor mitigating such demand-driven upward pressures on real unit costs of R & D that were set in motion by the expansion of government funding. In general, then, the balance of the long-run dynamic effects seems to favor the emergence at higher levels of aggregation of net complementarities, rather than a relationship dominated by ''crowding out'', or the substitution of public for private R & D investment.
Endogeneity, and common latent Õariables effects
Using this simple investment framework to clarify the expected channels of influence helps to formulate 23 On the economic significance of the rising numerical importance of foreign graduate students and post-doctoral fellows in Ž . university research systems, see Dasgupta and David 1994 . There is substantial evidence, most of it accumulated from surveys of company executives responsible for research and development, that firms actively search for recent trainees of university departments that have successfully drawn public funding for basic research; that they regard recent graduates as an important source of practical knowledge about the use of new techniques. See, e.g., Ž . Ž . Levin et al. 1987 and Pavitt 1991 More generally, it may well be that there are strong selectivity biases that lead firms which have a recognized competence for certain kinds of R & D to receive public contracts as well as to fund such activities with their own money. Beyond that, in cross-section analyses at the industry level, a distinct but related econometric problem may arise where both private and public investment decisions are responding to the same latent variable, namely, the inter-industry variation in the ''technological opportunity set.'' The possibility of exogenous changes in the state of the opportunities created for commercially attractive innovation -such as those opened up by developments in fiber optics, high-temperature superconductivity, or the availability of restriction enzyme techniques for ''gene-splicing'' -may confound efforts to identify the causal impact of public R & D allocations upon the pattern of private investment.
Even though the framework presented here has not undertaken to formalize these and other, more ''politically implicated'' sources of endogeneity in public R & D expenditures, it has assisted us in underscoring the need for empirical studies to be ex-( )plicit about their identifying assumptions, and to include proper ''control'' variables. The foregoing discussion also has highlighted the point that public R & D contracts are likely to have a much stronger immediate effect on the firm's marginal returns schedule than is the case with public R & D grants. For that reason alone, public contracts are more difficult to evaluate because those effects are readily confounded with the many other factors that shift the MRR schedule, including the nature of changes in the production and product technology, appropriability conditions, the type of product market competition, and so on.
As the previous discussion of identification problems may have suggested, to undertake to estimate the magnitude of the effect of public R & D spending upon private R & D investment at different levels of aggregation is tantamount to conducting rather widely differing ''experiments'' in the hope of determining ''the'' response. Some considerable doubt must surround the very idea that there is a universal relationship of that kind, and so it will be better to avoid casual comparisons and juxtapositions of findings, striving to compare like with like where that is feasible. Macro-level time-series studies have to consider feedback effects operating through price movement in the markets for R & D inputs, whereas in micro-level analyses the findings should reflect ''real'' rather than nominal expenditure relationships between public and private R & D. At least that would be so once controls had been entered for time Ž . effects in the form of year dummies . Of course, in saying this we assume that there is substantial potential mobility on the part of R & D personnel among firms and industries. In other words, when ''the experiment'' under analysis involves the provision of a subsidy for R & D conducted by a particular firm, it is reasonable to assume that the firm faces a highly elastic supply of R & D inputs, and therefore that input prices and unit costs cannot be materially affected by the subsidy. 24 The implication is that the observed effect on the level of private R & D 24 This is precisely true only for the log-log specification, where the aggregate price effects are in the constant term, or when the number of firms receiving subsidies is a small fraction of the total so that there is no price effect in the cross-section. spending should be somewhat weaker at the microeconomic level than that found by studies conducted Ž using aggregate data since the effects in the former . case are real rather than nominal . Nevertheless, at the lower level of aggregation there are likely to be additional complications due to the presence of significant cross-sectional differences in technological opportunity or innovation capabili-Ž ties ''competences'' in the terminology preferred by . the recent management literature . Some controls for ''fixed effects'' may be appropriate in such cases. But, in studies based on firm-and industry-level panel data, over time the ''innovation opportunity sets'' may be undergoing differential alterations among the various technological and market areas. Simple, fixed effects methods are then likely to prove inadequate to the task, and more complex econometric tactics would seem to be called for.
Thus alerted to the numerous underlying complexities that beset those in search of a straightforward empirical answer to the question of whether ''complementarity'' or ''substitution'' prevails in this domain, we may now be in a position to critically examine the econometric findings which the literature presently has to offer. . decrease in private R & D investment.'' On the whole, however, the magnitudes of the published estimates are very diverse. 25 In some instances, they are very difficult to compare directly, owing to variations in the specification of the estimated equation, and the absence of collateral statistical information needed to calculate dimension-free parameter estimates, such as elasticities. Our summary tables present the estimated elasticity of private R & D with respect to public R & D wherever it has been possible to obtain this magnitude.
To achieve appropriate comparability among the findings, we divide the studies into four main groups, according to the nature of the statistical observations used and the econometric approach complied with the following.
Ž . 1 Pure cross-section studies at the micro level, where firms or industries with different levels of government R & D funding are compared. Here it is crucial to control for differences in demand conditions, technological opportunity, and appropriability.
Ž .
2 Panel data studies at the micro level within a given industry, in which there are controls for timeinvariant differences among firms -each firm in effect serving as its own control, so that the results reflect individual firms' time-series responses to changes in government funding.
Ž .
3 Aggregate or macroeconomic studies, where the response is identified by changes in private R & D funding over time as a function of government R & D funding. Here it is important to control for macroeconomic influences that may be driving both variables. In addition, it is likely that results based on these studies will contain R & D input supply effects Ž . of the sort that are identified by Goolsbee 1998 and Ž . David and Hall 1999 .
Ž . 4 Studies, whether micro or macro, that attempt to control for the simultaneity between private and public R & D spending using instrumental variables. It is probable that the results from these studies will 25 Ž . For example, Wallsten 1999 concludes that there is a onefor-one crowding-out of private investment, whereas Robson Ž . 1993 concludes that there is a one-for-one stimulus of private R&D investment. To be sure, these studies were not analyzing the same dataset.
differ from those in the other studies if common omitted variables are a problem.
The discussion in Section 2 urges caution when interpreting the results of some of these regression studies. For example, when we look across firms or industries in a cross-section, we are seeing a set of Ž U equilibrium choices for the level of R & D R in . Fig. 1 , rather than tracing out the derived demand curve for R & D as a function of the position of the MCC curve. In fact, each of the firms and industries in question is likely to face a different demand curve for R & D investment, as well as a different MCC schedule. In addition, some of the effects of the public support for R & D will be to shift or otherwise change that curve. Many, but not all, researchers have attempted to control for the variability in the MRR curve when estimating the relationship, and in what follows we will try to assess the success of the approaches that they have taken in doing so.
Ž . Blank and Stigler 1957 suggested in their original formulation of the question that the most efficient and direct way to test for a complementary or substitution relationship is to analyze a sample of research programs over time within a ''suitable'' sample of companies. Due to data limitations, however, they were forced to rely on a cross-section of manufacturing firms in their analysis. Their method was to compare the ratios of scientific workers to all employment for firms with and without government contracts. For a total sample of 1564 firms in 1951, they found that firms with public contracts also had lower scientific personnel intensity working on private research. This result supports ''substitution,'' at least in the sense that public contracts were associated with fewer research personnel on private projects. When Blank and Stigler changed the sampling universe, however, and took it to be US manufacturing firms engaged in any R & D, public andror private, they reported that ''in general substitution is now almost absent.'' 26 Finally, using their most reliable data for firms with more than 5000 employees, they found evidence for complementarity. These results are consistent with the view that although many individual firms may find it attractive to sub- ) stitute government funding for their own R & D budgets, the large firms are better able to take advantage of complementarities, due to knowledge spillovers and pump-priming effects. The latter may operate across lines-of-business and even standard industrial classification lines, so that the size of those firms may really be a surrogate for the product diversification that enables them to appropriate benefits from the less predictable range of their R & D projects. Blank and Stigler, however, warned that their estimate based on variation across firms and industries at a point in time could be seriously biased by other sources of heterogeneity, for example, variations in technological conditions faced by different firms. Table 1 lists the sample used, the econometric methodology and type of data, the form of the private R & D variable to be explained, the form of the public R & D explanatory variable, as well as the ''net'' findings reported by the authors. Ž . Scott 1984 performs a cross-sectional analysis on FTC line-of-business data for 437 firms in 259 four-digit industries. He finds that private R & D is positively associated with government financed R & D using both a restricted intensity version of the relationship, and a log-level version. In both cases, his estimates are robust to the inclusion of firm dummy variables and four-digit industry dummy variables. The results also hold up whether or not firms that have zero company financed R & D are included from the sample. As is the case for many of the studies surveyed here, his analysis may be biased because of endogeneity between public and private R & D, due to omitted variables that drive both sets of funding decisions. At least part of the ''belowfirm'' variation across lines-of-business probably is attributable to variation in technological opportunities and appropriability conditions that are affecting the marginal returns. Scott's use of industry dummies should capture some of these omitted variables. Ž . The analysis of Hamberg 1966 represented a step forward in two important ways. First, he focused on DOD contracts awarded to individual industry groups. The institutional homogeneity of the funding agency and the industry group help limit potential omitted variables bias from other sources of variation like technological opportunities. Second, he included an impressive combination of control variables such as profits, sales, depreciation, gross investment, and a lag of R & D personnel. As we saw in Section 3, these variables help hold constant other factors that may be shifting the firm's marginal returns and cost of funds schedules. However, the cost of the homogeneity of his sample is a small sample size for each regression. His largest industry group had only 34 firms. Lichtenberg 1984; 1987; 1988 has stressed the econometric issues involved in the analysis of the relationship between public contract R & D and private R & D investment. He has employed a demand Ž and supply framework similar in spirit to the . micro-level investment framework presented here in order to make two basic points: first, that public R & D contracts should be treated as endogenous at the firm level; second, that sales to government are more R & D intensive and have an effect on private marginal returns that should be included in the specification. In his 1984 paper, Lichtenberg also suggests that the failure of previous studies to account for time constant and unobserved firm characteristics has led to an upward bias on the coefficient estimates. Using data on a cross-section of firms in three different time periods, he presents regression results for private R & D intensity in both level and first-dif-Ž ference specifications i.e., estimates that control for . permanent differences across firms . The mostly positive and significant coefficients on public R & D become negative and significant in the latter regressions, which implies that the observed complementarity was due to firm-level differences in R & D intensities that are correlated with the award of public R & D contracts. Increases or decreases in public R & D funding within the firm were not associated with increases or decreases of private funding. As in all such differenced regressions, however, the potential for downward bias due to measurement error in the independent variable must be kept in mind.
Line of business and laboratory studies
Firm-leÕel studies
Ž The subsequent papers of Lichtenberg 1987;  . 1988 address the issues posed by the tendency of federal procurement demand to concentrate on more R & D-intensive products, and the potential endogeneity of federal contracts. His 1987 paper combines firm data from Compustat and the Federal Procurement Data System to construct a panel of 187 firms over the period [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] . He demonstrates that the value of government contracts variable becomes insignificant once government purchases are included separately in the regression equation.
Using a sample of 169 firms from the same Ž . database, Lichtenberg 1988 proceeds to further partition federal contracts into ''competitive'' and ''non-competitive.'' While his results show a positive and significant government R & D coefficient for the total and ''within'' OLS regressions, the coefficient becomes negative and significant when he accounts for endogeneity using as an instrumental variable potential government contracts for products that the firm produces. It is important to note that the government sales variable in the regression includes the value of government contracts. As he makes clear, his results imply that there is no additional effect of government contracts beyond their impact Wallsten 1999 are the most recent firm-level studies on the publicrprivate R & D relationship. Wallsten focuses on the effects of the US Small Business Ž . Innovation Research Program SBIR . This is a competitive grant program designed to target R & D subsidies to smaller businesses, and Wallsten was able to collect data on firms that have won SBIR awards, firms that applied but were rejected, and firms that were eligible to apply but did not apply. His sample of awardees comes from the data systems of eleven different governmental agencies and covers a variety of industrial areas over the 1990-1992 time period. In order to correct for the potential endogeneity of the public funding decision on the firm's R & D response, Wallsten uses a three-equation system intended to model the award granting process as well as the firm's response. Estimating the system by 3SLS and using the total SBIR budget from which firms could have won awards as his instrument, he finds that the number of SBIR awards won by a firm has a positive but insignificant effect on firm employment. In a separate set of regressions, he finds that the number and value of SBIR awards significantly reduces firm R & D expenditure. In these latter regressions, however, Wallsten is forced to analyze only publicly owned firms and this reduces his sample of firms from 481 observations to 81 observations. Based on the typical size of an SBIR award, Wallsten concludes that public grants displace private R & D investment on a nearly one-for-one basis, although it must be noted that this finding pertains only to the publicly owned recipients of such funding.
Ž . Busom 1999 analyzes the effect of Spanish government subsidized loans on private R & D expenditure and employment using a sample of Spanish Ž . firms. Like Wallsten 1999 , Busom is careful to address the potential endogeneity of the public funding decision stemming from selection bias in the grant process. She explores this problem by implementing a two-step procedure that predicts the probability of participation in the program in the first step, and includes a correction for selection in the second step. Using a sample of 147 Spanish firms in 1988, Busom finds that the hypothesis of no selection bias cannot be rejected, even thought, the legitimacy of pooling participant and non-participant firms is rejected by a Chow test. Unfortunately, her data does not include the amount of the R & D subsidy, only the fact that it exists; so she is unable to provide a quantitative estimate of the complementarity or crowding-out effect. She finds, that on average, receiving a government R & D subsidy induces more private R & D effort than would be predicted on the basis of an R & D effort equation for the ''controls-Ž . firms'' those that did not receive a subsidy , when corrections are made for sample selection biases. For 30% of the firms, however, full crowding-out remained a possibility that could not be ruled out by the data. It will be interesting to see results based on data from this Spanish program in the future, especially those that reveal the amount as well as the presence of the R & D subsidies.
In addition to the typical econometric formulations that regress some measure of private R & D on public R & D, an increasing number of alternative and more indirect approaches have been pursued in recent years. Since these papers are less direct than those considered above, the following brief resumes report only the ''bottomline'' from these efforts. The interested reader is urged to consult the original studies for more detail. Lerner 1999 looks at the long-run impact of the SBIR program on firm sales and employment. He finds that these government grants have only a limited positive impact, except in those areas where there also is substantial venture capital activity. The specification, however, does not allow one to distinguish whether the presence of venture capital funding exerts its effect through shifting the MCC schedule, or whether it is really a surrogate for technological opportunity set differences, i.e., proxying the ( )attraction of biotechnology and software innovations that can be pursued by small firms. Ž . Cockburn and Henderson 1998 analyze the coauthorship of scientific papers between public and private institutions in the US. They find that private firm organization and research productivity are positively related to the fraction of co-authorship with academic institutions, which are largely supported by federal funds. In a closely related study, Narin et al. Ž . 1997 examine the contribution of public science to industrial technology using patent citation measures. Their research finds a strong link between industrial patents and publicly supported research. Feldman Ž . and Lichtenberg 1998 report finding that for a sample of European Union member countries there is a strong positive relationship between the number of private institutions that specialize in a particular scientific field and the number of public institutions specializing in the same scientific field. They interpret this result as evidence of complementarity between public and private investments in R & D.
Industry-leÕel studies
There have only been a handful of industry level studies on the relationship between public R & D and private R & D investment, probably because at this level of aggregation the absence of a clear ''experiment'' is most glaring. The most important proximate source of variation in R & D intensity across firms is differences in industry, and this is as true of public R & D as of private R & D expenditures. Therefore we should not be surprised if industry-level studies show complementarity between the two, nor should we conclude anything other than the fact that some industries have greater technological opportunity than others.
The industry studies are summarized in Table 3 . 
Aggregate studies
We have identified seven aggregate macro econometric studies of the publicrprivate R & D relationship in the recent journal literature. These papers are summarized in Table 4 Table 4 Aggregate studies All studies use US data unless otherwise noted. See Table 2 Thus, both of the foregoing studies conclude that at the aggregate level the overall, the net relationship between public and private investments for basic research is one of complements, not substitutes. Indeed, the estimated the elasticity reported by Dia-Ž . mond 1998 is very high, roughly unitary. It should be noted, however, that as these results are obtained from the co-variation in the aggregate time-series observations, they could be reflecting the correlated effects of other macroeconomic variables. Neither study makes use of instrumental variables to control for the influence of the US business cycle and shifts in overall federal fiscal policy during the period in question.
As an alternative to attempting to control for the possible influences of those omitted variables, a different approach is available where one can make use of cross-country panel data to deal with the endogeneity problem that is likely to plague timeseries analyses of a single economy. Indeed, there have been some recent attempts to exploit this possible route to identifying the nature of the publicprivate R & D relationship, by employing aggregatelevel time-series observations for OECD countries in panel form. Starting with a sample of nine OECD Ž . countries for the period of 1963 -1984 , Levy 1990 works with a specification that distinguishes among three geographic regions within which it is assumed that there would be strong spillovers of the effects of public R & D expenditures: the US, Europe, and Japan. He therefore regresses national private R & D investment on aggregate public R & D investment in each region, aggregate regional GDP, and individual country dummy variables. Among the nine countries Ž . in his panel, Levy 1990 finds that five countries exhibit significant overall public-private complementarity effects, whereas two countries show significant substitution effects. The reasons for the differences remain unexplored, which is understandable in view of the restricted size of the cross-national sam- 28 Rather more illuminating results are likely to be obtained by exploiting the availability of this enlarged panel to estimate models whose specifications take account of cross-country differences in the set of structural characteristics that David and Hall Ž . 1999 suggests would affect the sign of the aggregate reduced-form relationship between public and private R & D investments.
Because it addresses an essentially macro-level effect, we also should take notice here of the investi-Ž . gation by Goolsbee 1998 Ž As we have noted in our earlier discussion see . Sections 2.5 and 2.6 of the R & D input market effects of an exogenous increase -in either public 28 The countries exhibiting complementarity in this respect are: Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, New Zealand and the USA. But the preliminary results overall are decidedly mixed: Ž . leaving aside the three countries among the 22 for which the coefficient on changes in government-financed R&D is both non-significant and close to zero, in 10 of the remaining 18 cases the coefficient is found to be positive. Moreover, other sources of endogeneity, such as simultaneity bias and omitted technological opportunity variables are minimized, given the estimated lag in the relationship and technology class structure of the model. This much having been said in favor of the use of industry level technology classes, Toole's approach does assume that firm effects are less important than technology class effects. That well may be the case for the more dynamic high-technology industries, but it is less likely to hold for more mature non-science-based industries. It would be revealing, therefore, to carry out a similarly detailed analysis at the firm level, but, unfortunately, the distribution of proprietary R & D investments among specific technological areas is not information that businesses are likely to disclose until it ceases to be regarded as having any future commercial relevance.
Summary and conclusions
The discussion introducing this survey elaborated a standard unifying framework within which to examine R & D investment at the microeconomic level. With its help we sought to identify the distinctive channels through which the provision of government subsidies would affect the behavior of business firms, associating those effects with shifts either of the firm's MRR schedule, or of its MCC schedule, or of both.
The implications of the firm-level analysis was compared with the insights obtained from a heuristic structural model of relationships that would obtain at the macro-level, drawing for the latter on the analy-Ž . sis recently presented by David and Hall 1999 . Recognition of the existence of heterogeneities and asymmetries among firms, quite apart of problems arising from the interdependence of enterprise behavior in imperfectly competitive markets, was seen to render invalid the attempt to pass from the micro-to the macro-analytic level directly, by separate aggregation of the MRR and MCC schedules and solution of the industry, sectoral or economy-wide equilibrium. This occasions the need for a separate macrolevel framework, in which the effects of funding upon the prices of R & D inputs, as well as informational spillovers, can be represented for both the short-run and long-run cases.
In the development of this part of the exposition, simplicity, rather than novelty was the criterion to which the discussion adhered. Its two immediate purposes were to highlight the principal econometric issues that would need to be addressed by the ensuing critical review, and to provide guidance in interpreting the empirical findings reported by the quite diverse array of studies that compose the literature on this topic. Insofar as those goals were met, we believe that a strong initial case has been made for the value of paying greater attention to structural modeling; certainly, for taking structural modeling further than has been the norm for research contributions addressing the issue of whether or not public funding of R & D encourages, or simply substitutes for R & D investments made by business enterprises.
This survey deliberately has eschewed an effort to arrive at any definitive empirical conclusions regarding the sign and magnitude of the relationship between public and private R & D. In doing so, we have acknowledged the multiplicity of the approaches to this question that appear in the literature, and the consequent lack of immediate comparability between studies conducted at differing levels of aggregation, and treating a variety of modes and purposes in government funding of R & D.
Quite apart from the difficulties of rendering the results of those studies in a form that would permit ready quantitative comparisons, the heterogeneity of experience created by the application of institutionally different subsidy programs to diverse industries and areas of technology provides strong grounds for doubting the usefulness of searching for ''the'' right answer. Beyond our commentary on the individual contributions, what, then, it is possible to extract, by way of a valid and intelligible overview of the present state of empirical knowledge on this question?
Guided by insights from the analytical framework, our examination of the literature proceeded by comparing and contrasting empirical studies that first were grouped according to the level of aggregation at which the relationship between publicly and privately funded R & D was examined. In addition an effort was made to distinguish between findings pertaining to the impact of government contracts, Tables 1-4 noted those contributions that rest exclusively on data about US experience. The latter comprise about two thirds of the 33 sets of results assembled for examination, and keeping in mind this dimension of heterogeneity in the sources of ''the evidence'' -in addition to that arising from variations in ''level of aggregation'' dimension -would seem to be pertinent for a number of reasons. Among the more obvious and straight-forward of these should be mentioned the fact that observations drawn from the third quarter of the century carry considerably greater weight in the body of US evidence than is the case for the studies of experience elsewhere. The compar-Ž atively greater importance of defense and aeronautic . and space contracts for R & D in the total of US government funding for industrially performed R & D, also is a differentiating characteristic that may be significant.
This suggests we should reconsider the shape of the literature explicitly from those two taxonomic perspectives. And, indeed, several striking features of the distribution of overall findings are exposed by the simple tabulation in Table 5 , in which our sample of studies are arrayed according to the level of aggregation, and national source of data. As may be seen from the table, exactly one-third of the cases report that public R & D funding behaves as a substitute for private R & D investment. This result is far more prevalent among the studies conducted at the line-of-business and firm level, than among those carried out at the industry and higher aggregation levels -where the relative frequency approaches Ž . one-half 9r19 .
A second pattern that stands out from the table is that whereas five-sixths of the studies based on data from countries other than the US report overall complementarity, the corresponding proportion among those based purely on US data is only fourw Ž .x sevenths 1-9r21 . That has some bearing upon a third feature of interest in Table 5 : the regional contrast in the findings that emerges within the group of studies conducted at and below the level of the firm. Here one sees a marked difference between the distribution of the US-based findings and the much higher relative frequency with which complementarity is reported by analysts working exclusively from US evidence.
It may well be that this latter contrast is in part reflecting underlying differences between the character of the US federal R & D contracts and awards, and the purposes and terms of the more recent European government programs of funding for industrial R & D. It should be noted, however, that the frequency with which ''complementarity'' appears among US-based studies pertaining to experience at the line-of-business and firm levels cannot be regarded as being anomalously low; not at least when it is viewed within the overall context of the distribution of findings summarized by Table 5 . 31 Our analysis directed particular attention to the differences one should expect to find in the results of studies that are conducted at different levels of ag-31 Quite the contrary, this can be seen by taking the analysis of the figure in Table 5 one step further. Consider that the proportion of ''complementarity'' results among all the US-based studies is Ž . 4r7 , and the fraction of all lower aggregation level studies that Ž . report complementarity is 11r19 . Under independence of the Ž . two effects, therefore, we might expect 4r12 of the US studies based on line-of-business and firm level data to have reported Ž . ''complementarity''; whereas the observed frequency is 5r12 . This is not a significant deviation from the theoretical expectation, and, in addition, it is in the direction opposite that which superficial examination of the table might suggest. Table 5 conform well with these theoretical expectations. Complementarity appears more prevalent, and substitution effects all but vanish among the subgroup of studies that have investigated this relationship at the industry and national economy levels.
Is this to be read as telling us something about the strength of the positive impacts that inter-firm and inter-industry spillovers, through knowledge and tangible R & D input markets, have upon the expected private rates of return on company-funded R & D? Or is it reflecting some combination of the endogenous responses of both government and business allocation decisions to opportunities being open by fundamental scientific and technological advances, and the ''R & D price effects'' of the competition generated by private and public funders for limited scientific and engineering resources?
At present, these questions remain open, and no less important than they were when Blank and Stigler Ž . 1957 launched the search for answers. Progress towards resolving them will require further, microlevel studies that make a serious effort to control for the effects of cross-section and temporal variations in technological opportunities, along with other sources of variation affecting expected private rates of return. To the extent that government policies affecting public R & D funding are correlated with initiatives intended to enhance appropriability of research benefits by investing firms in areas of new technological opportunity, identification of the former effects from single country analyses will remain difficult. Further utilization of international panel data seems a promising avenue for further work in this as in other connections. Ž Research using use quasi-experimental propen-. sity score or sample selection corrections to comparing ''treated'' firms and ''controls'' offers another line of future advance, especially if it could be coupled with the design of actual policy experiments. 32 This suggests the concluding thought that really important gains in the informational basis for economic policy in this area are only likely to come as a by-product of coupling better policy design with the application of the sophisticated econometric techniques that have now become available.
